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ABSTRACT

This study examines the relationship between the lack of economic development
and unemployment against the eruption of civil unrest and political instability. I illustrate
how political instability in one country is a cause for concern for neighboring countries
within the region, thereby creating an incentive for the larger, international community to
promote, support, and bolster economic activities and growth in said country.

Within the field of international relations (IR), the efforts of governments,
international organizations, and grassroots, non-governmental organizations in addressing
development are the primary focus. However, the role of philanthropic organizations in
promoting development and economic development abroad is less frequently examined.
This thesis demonstrates how philanthropic activities can promote economic
development and sustain international peace and security using Ghana and Nigeria as
case studies.

Philanthropy has an important role in promoting stability in international
relations, albeit indirectly. When conducted as results-oriented, investment activities, it
can improve the quality and quantity of economic opportunities available to citizens.
Consequently, high levels of social discontent and unrest that often trigger protests,
uprisings, and violence will decrease, thereby reducing the potential of conflict spillover
into cross-border areas.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction
In this study, I examine the relationship between the lack of economic
development and unemployment against the eruption of civil unrest and political
instability. I also illustrate how political instability in one country is a cause for concern
for neighboring countries within the region, thereby creating an incentive for the larger,
international community to promote, support, and bolster economic activities and growth
in said country. Within the field of international relations (IR), the efforts of
governments, international organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank,
and grassroots, non-governmental organizations in addressing development are the
primary focus. However, the role of philanthropic organizations in promoting
development and economic development abroad is less frequently examined. To this
objective, this paper will examine how U.S. philanthropic activities can promote
economic development using Nigeria as a case study.

Nigeria has experienced decades of sectarian violence which is often
misconstrued as an issue of religious conflict. Although recognizing that such tensions
can often stem from sectarian differences, this study will take an economic approach and
argue instead that the tensions between Islamic and Christian groups that divide the
country more accurately arise from high poverty levels and severely unequal distribution
of wealth. The region is steeped in competition for strained resources including lack of
access to agricultural lands but more critically, severely limited employment
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opportunities. In other words, ethnic tensions and violence are driven by economic
disparity.

Here, as we have witnessed in other parts of the world, lack of access to economic
opportunities can lead to discontent, protest, and violence, with large ramifications for
spillover and the spread of conflict into cross-border regions. A complex relationship
exists between economic growth and political stability, leading some to argue for a direct,
causal relationship that growth leads to stability, while others contend the inverse to be
true. This paper does not intend to disregard or lessen the influence of each of these
factors and recognizes the circular interaction that exists between them. However, the
scope of this paper lies specifically in exploring and highlighting the impact of economic
growth and development as one of several factors in reducing conflict and political
instability.

Additionally, I argue that philanthropic organizations can reduce poverty levels
and have a role in creating economic opportunities and spurring growth at the local level.
There are opportunities for reducing ethnic and group tensions when citizens are
economically engaged which would constitute a positive gain for the larger objective of
sustained international peace and security, and the role of philanthropic organizations in
this effort is one worth exploring. I also argue that philanthropy has an important role in
promoting stability in international relations, albeit indirectly. Philanthropy, when
conducted as results-oriented, investment activities can improve the quality and quantity
of economic opportunities available to citizens. When this occurs, quality Gross
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Domestic Product (GDP) growth more likely follows which reduces high levels of
discontent and unrest that often trigger conflict and have the potential to spillover and
affect cross-border areas.

To begin, I will review secondary sources of information, including economic
data sets and scholarly literature in the forms of books, chapters, articles, and news
reports to examine the relationship between economic growth and political and civilian
security. Following this I will survey the traditional methods of delivering foreign aid
with a special focus on philanthropic trends and activities, as well as the role of
philanthropies in providing aid and promoting economic growth in developing countries.
And finally, I will examine various types of funding mechanisms carried out by
philanthropic organizations in both Ghana and Nigeria including traditional grant-making
models in contrast to philanthropic driven projects in venture capital and impact
investment approaches. There is an accountability mechanism built into these strategies
that produce greater, more sustainable and quality results at levels that straight grantmaking models do not necessarily produce. This paper will look to make a case for
philanthropic strategies vis-à-vis venture capital and impact investment schemas as the
preferred method for achieving levels of economic stability that will positively impact
regional security.

Background
Recent global events illustrate the significance of access to jobs and employment
opportunities in ensuring the longevity and stability of political regimes and institutions.
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This relationship has been portrayed in several regions including the civilian protests in
Egypt during 2011 which led to the eventual collapse of the Mubarak regime, continued
political strife and upheaval in the Kashmir region between Indian and Pakistani youth
vying for a limited number of job opportunities, riots springing from disenfranchised
Muslim youth in France during the summer of 2010, “Occupy Wall Street”
demonstrations spreading across the United States rallying against corporate greed and
joblessness, and protracted and violent ethnic disputes among tribal groups in Nigeria
stemming from competition for strained resources such as employment opportunities and
access to agricultural lands among other issues.

The aforementioned events that unfolded in Egypt serve as a poignant example
that underscores the suggestion that economic stability does indeed have ramifications for
domestic security (and consequently regional security by way of spillover effects). This
relationship is apparent in the onslaught of mass protests and riots that took place in the
streets of Tahrir Square in Egypt in 2011, which brewed from growing discontent and
frustrations over rising unemployment rates and spurred a civilian movement that shook
Mubarak’s politically autocratic regime and loosened its grip. Specifically, Egyptian
youth played a significant role in building momentum and leading the charge in a
passionate and powerful, collective demand for change. These developments created a
ripple effect in the Middle East, igniting waves of demonstrations in the region including
the Arab Spring movement. The magnitude, scale, and explosive potential of deeply
entrenched frustrations of a restive unemployed constituency in these countries served to
alert the international community of the political instability that could ensue. Neighboring
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countries to those experiencing internal strife also began to recognize the costs of
absorbing displaced persons both economically and towards national security goals.
Consequently, more attention is now being paid to the need for job creation, especially
among youth. In Ghana for example, the National Youth Employment Programme was
initiated in 2006 and continues to be the largest government effort to date aimed toward
training, preparing, and building the capacity of youth beneficiaries to secure permanent
employment positions in eighteen sectors including agriculture, oil, education, and
sanitation. The country’s high unemployment rates and especially among youth had
spurred this effort which was designed to create more job opportunities and open
channels for employment by providing skills development support, internship
placements, and on the job training; more recently the initiative has refocused its
methodology on promoting entrepreneurial approaches and helping beneficiaries to
identify business opportunities as well as improving access to credit lines.
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CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review
Internal instability, chaos, and the inability of governments to ensure law and
order and security for constituents within territorial boundaries have been cited by several
scholars as a source of potential conflict that can erupt and flow across borders to the
detriment of neighboring countries. In How to Rebuild Africa, Stephen Ellis describes
two frequently shared characteristics of dysfunctional states, including the inability to
guarantee law and order within its territory and to fulfill duties affecting the international
community at large.1 Further, he states that failed states which embody these
characteristics can be dangerous for the maintenance of international security,
specifically noting the events of September 11, 2001 to illustrate this point. For example,
chaos in Afghanistan led to detrimental spillover effects that jeopardized the security of
other nations internationally.2 Ellis’ descriptive analysis is appropriate in examining the
state of Nigeria where internal security issues have continued to worsen, thus leading to a
potential spillover situation and threatening regional security. The domestic security
situation in Nigeria will be covered in greater detail in subsequent pages.

Building on Ellis’ forecast, Alberto Ades and Hak B. Chua make the case that
spillover tendencies can reduce economic growth in neighboring countries. This study
highlights the consequences and costs to the regional community if political instability in
neighboring countries is ignored. The authors illustrate specifically that it is the economic

1
2

Stephen Ellis. (2005). How to Rebuild Africa. Foreign Affairs, 84(5), p. 138.
Ibid.
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performance of states not directly involved in the conflict that will duly experience
decline.3 It supports the argument that having politically stable countries as neighbors
will mean less potential for conflict spillovers that threaten security. Furthermore,
ensuring or aiding this goal should be regarded and pursued as sound foreign policy by
those countries not directly involved. Steven Radelet also examines the relationship
between political stability and economic growth. In Emerging Africa, he discusses five
fundamental changes that have brought about improved economic, political, and
developmental growth in seventeen Sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations. He places
paramount emphasis on improved democratic climates, more accountable governments,
and stronger leadership as the key to economic growth in these countries.4 According to
Radelet, the economic growth that has been prevalent in these emerging countries is
firstly the product of a shift toward more democratic systems of government.5 Noting that
all of the seventeen emerging economies in SSA first attained the scores outlined by the
Freedom House and Polity IV standards to be considered as democracies, Radelet
explains that economic growth and improved governance soon followed. 6 Improved,
democratic governance has meant that leaders are more accountable to their citizens and
has allowed better economic policies to be put in place which in turn has spurred growth
that has provided citizens with tangible benefits.7 Although arguing for a relationship that
progresses in this sequential order, Radelet also recognizes that accelerated growth has
the ability to reinforce democratic practices and better governance, stating that “it appears
3

Alberto Ades and Hak B. Chua. (1997). Thy Neighbor’s Curse: Regional Instability and Economic Growth.
Journal of Economic Growth, 2( 3), p. 297.
4
Steven Radelet. (2010). Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way. Washington, DC:
Center for Global Development.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid, p. 66.
7
Ibid.
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that they are connected in a virtuous circle in which improvements in one area helps
support improvements in the others.”8

Similarly, Jenny Minier asserts that countries with more democratically stable
governments also see higher economic growth whereby “…political freedoms reinforce
economic freedoms.”9 Although this is the crux of Minier’s argument, she does
acknowledge the reverse, a relationship that earlier several theorists and scholars had
declared in research literature. She cites Huntington’s study which highlighted the role of
economic growth in building democratic political systems in Greece, Spain, Brazil, South
Korea, and Taiwan.10 Additionally, Minier notes arguments by Lipset, Moore and
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, whom identify a larger middle class as a result of
economic growth which subsequently influences and shapes norms and values (both
social and political) toward those that are more democratic in nature and form.11

Dambisa Moyo however, rejects Minier’s argument that democracy leads to
economic growth. Instead, Moyo states “What is clear is that democracy is not the
prerequisite for economic growth that aid proponents maintain. On the contrary, it is
economic growth that is a prerequisite for democracy…”.12 Several other scholars are
also in agreement with Moyo’s assertion. In Political Instability and Economic Growth,
Alberto Alesina et al., offers low economic growth as a contributing factor to government
8

Ibid.
Jenny A. Minier. (1998). Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches. Journal of Economic Growth,
(3), p. 243.
10
Ibid, p. 243-244.
11
Ibid, p. 244.
12
Dambisa Moyo. (2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa.
New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.
9
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instability.13 Particularly, they find that in nondemocratic states, low growth is a source of
dissatisfaction among the masses which in turn spurs anti-government efforts and leads to
political destabilization.14

Richard Posner echoes a similar argument, concluding that a higher median
income is a stronger indicator of political stability than a higher average income.15 That
is, ensuring that general income levels are higher overall (i.e. growing a middle class) is
more critical to maintaining political influence and would be more beneficial towards this
end than cultivating an upper class with disproportionately higher incomes than the rest
of the masses.16 Posner illustrates this point by raising the examples of “riots in slum
neighborhoods in U.S. cities and in French suburbs (black in the United States, North
African immigrants in France) [which] confirm the existence among the permanently
poor or near-poor of smoldering resentments exacerbated by social neglect.”17 However,
because the larger constituency in these nations lean toward middle class status, they are
able to bolster and support political regimes (and therefore, contribute to political
stability) that may be targeted by the underclass in an effort to air its frustrations and
discontent. As Minier notes, earlier scholars also drew similar conclusions.

Seymour Martin Lipset conducted extensive studies on the impact of various
economic indices including wealth, urbanization, education, and industrialization and the
13

Alberto Alesina, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, & Phillip Swagel. (1996). Political Instability and Economic
Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, (1), p. 191.
14
Ibid.
15
Richard A. Posner. (1997). Equality, Wealth, and Political Stability. The Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization, 13( 2), p. 349.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid, p. 348.
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consequences of these factors for democracy.18 Wealth, as Lipset defines, is measured by
per capita income, the number of persons for every motor vehicle and for every
physician, as well as the number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per every
thousand persons in a country.19 With regard to per capita income, he finds more
democratic, European countries yielding an average of $695 versus $308 in less
democratic countries.20 In Latin America, he finds a similar trend of $171 for more
democratic counties in the region as compared to $119 in ones that are less so.21 The
relationship between education and democracy is also illuminated through his studies,
offering that increased education serves to broaden the individual outlook of man,
increase tolerance, reduce inclinations toward extremism, and strengthen the capacity of
man to make rational choices as they relate to electoral activities and decision making.22
As such, Lipset argues that increased income, economic security, and education can lead
citizens to assume more complex and gradualist political perspectives which in turn
reduces their commitment to more extremist political views that counteract the
development of democratic systems.23 Furthermore, Lipset contends that increased
wealth “affects the political role of the middle class through changing the shape of the
stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lowerclass base, to a diamond with a growing middle-class. A large middle class [he offers]

18

Seymour Martin Lipset. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), p. 71.
19
Ibid, p. 75.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid, p. 79.
23
Ibid, p. 83.
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plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and
democratic parties and penalize extremist groups.”24

Samuel P. Huntington cites a study conducted in 1981 which further promotes a
positive correlation between economic development and the prevalence of free and
democratic governments. The study compared the World Bank’s rating of countries in
terms of economic development with their Freedom House’s ratings on the measure of
liberty and found two of thirty-six low-income countries to be classified as “free” or
democratic, fourteen of sixty middle-income countries to fall under the same category,
and eighteen of twenty-four high-income countries to be classified accordingly.25
Referencing this study, Huntington states that countries occupying a higher rung on the
economic ladder will likely be more democratic as well.26 While maintaining that there is
a strong correlation between wealth and democracy, Huntington does acknowledge that
both could be caused by a third factor. He cites Protestantism as one of these factors
which has been argued by some to have brought about capitalism and democracy.27
Moreover, although Huntington recognizes the counter argument that democracy could
indeed spur economic wealth and development, he maintains that high rates of economic
wealth are preceded by high rates of economic growth which does not necessarily require
democratic systems.28 Therefore, Huntington concludes that “it seems unlikely that

24

Ibid.
Samuel P. Huntington. (1984). Will More Countries Become Democratic? Political Science Quarterly,
99(2), p. 199.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
25
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wealth depends on democracy, and, if a connection exists, democracy must depend on
wealth.”29

Finally, Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens also
promote the causal relationship between economic development and democracy. Their
explanation however offers that economic growth and development functions to
transform class structure. As a result, the working and middle-class become more
efficient and capable at self-organizing which makes it more challenging for elites to
exclude them from political activities and other forms of participation.30 The argument
for ensuring economic growth and development in the pursuit of sustaining political
stability and security is an important relationship that supports the need for investment in
job creation and the expansion of access to employment opportunities which will be
further discussed in forthcoming chapters.

29

Ibid.
Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, & John D. Stephens. (1993). The Impact of Economic
Development on Democracy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), p. 83.
30
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CHAPTER THREE

A Comparison of Economic Growth and Stability in Two African States
It is apparent through a survey of the literature, that there is a strong scholarly
support for the correlation between high economic growth and greater political or
democratic stability. Two traditional indicators of economic growth include a country’s
GDP which is described as the value of all goods and services produced by a country
within a specific time period, and the Human Development Index (HDI) which measures
a country’s progress toward human development along three dimensions including access
to health, education, and income. According to data compiled by the African Economic
Report, the following table illustrates the relative progress that Ghana has made along
both indicators as compared to Nigeria.

Real GDP change 2010
Real GDP change 2011 (estimated)
Real GDP change 2012 (predicted)
Real GDP change 2013 (predicted)
HDI 2011

Ghana

Nigeria

7.7

7.8

13.7

6.7

8.3

6.9

7.7

6.6

0.541

0.459

Source: African Economic Outlook 201231

31

African Economic Outlook 2012. (2012). [Graph illustration The Guardian May 28, 2012]. Retrieved from
https://www.google.com/fusiontables/data?docid=1wjrxuCjjgYpI46-Gacv7aFOIqCNNYvpIgshsPZo
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It is clear that Ghana outranks Nigeria on both economic indicators. The HDI is
especially telling as it more closely indicates the standard of living and access to social
services than does the GDP, which conveys little about the actual distribution of wealth.

In addition to these indicators, access to employment opportunities is another
economic indicator that conveys information about a country’s progress toward human
development. In Global Employment Trends 2012, the International Labour Organization
reports that progress toward the reduction of working poverty in the Sub-Saharan Africa
region has been meager and along with South Asia, it is one of two regions globally that
are unlikely to reach the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by
2015. Moreover the report warns that lack of progress in reducing poverty may also
derail growth and put at risk the successful attainment of other MDG goals in the areas of
health and education.32 MDG progress in Ghana is substantially ahead of that which is
seen in Nigeria as illustrated in the following chart which displays the percentage change
in population living below the poverty threshold of $1.25 USD per day between the
decade spanning from 1998 to 2008.

32

International Labour Organization. (2012). Global Employment Trends 2012: Preventing a Deeper Job
Crisis. Geneva.
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Source: United Nations Development Programme33

Towards the goal of eradicating extreme poverty, Ghana is well on its way to
halving extreme poverty by the year 2015. In fact, the overall poverty rate in Ghana has
been reduced from a 51.6% in 1995 to 28.5% in 2006; there is confidence that this rate
will be further reduced to 26% well before 2015.34 Additionally, the proportion of the
population living in extreme poverty has also declined from 36.5% to 18.2% between
1995-2006, exceeding the 2015 target rate of 19%.35

33

United Nations Development Programme. (2011). Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium
Development Goals: MDG Report 2011. New York.
34
United National Development Programme. (2012). MDG Progress in Ghana. Retrieved from
http://www.undp-gha.org/mainpages.php?page=MDG%20Progress
35
Ibid.

17

In Nigeria however, progress towards this first MDG goal is meager. Comparable
figures do not exist to measure progress in the Nigerian case. Instead, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) offices in Nigeria report that “…the target will be
difficult to meet. Growth needs to be more equitable and broad-based. Developing
agriculture and creating jobs will require the public sector to create an enabling
environment for business… and providing sustainable access to enterprise finance. Social
protection and poverty eradication programmes need to be scaled-up and better
coordinated.”36 The lack of data is telling of the slow progress and challenges faced by
Nigeria in pursuing economic growth that is more equitably distributed and ensuring the
well-being of its citizens through poverty alleviation.

Taking these figures into consideration it is unsurprising to learn that the
unemployment rate in Nigeria by far overshoots that which is prevalent in Ghana at 21%
and 11%, respectively.37 Between the period of 1997-2000, Ghana saw a sharp decline in
the unemployment rate, starting at 20% and dropping to 11%.38 The Nigerian experience
however, seems to be regressing instead and while there was an extreme decline in
unemployment between 1992-2005, from 28% to 2.9%, this rate has increased in the past
several years jumping to 5.8% in 2006 to a slight drop to 4.9% in 2007, and soaring to a
massive 21% in 2011.39

36

United National Development Programme. (2012). MDGs in Nigeria: Current Progress. Retrieved from
http://www.ng.undp.org/mdgsngprogress.shtml
37
CIA World Factbook. (2012). Unemployment Rate – Country Comparison [Data file]. Retrieved from
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=74
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
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Moreover, falling within the category of the unemployed is a significant and
unsettling mass of jobless youth. Nick Mead reports, “around 60% of the [African]
continent’s unemployed are aged 15 to 24 – and more than half of these, many women,
have given up on finding work.”40 The rise in youth unemployment is particularly
disturbing as this population is not only growing rapidly but also becoming better
educated.41 By 2030, it is projected that 59% of Africa’s youth aged 20-24 years will
have attained a secondary education as compared with 42% today, or 137 million youth
completing secondary education and 12 million obtaining tertiary degrees by the same
year.42 While this presents an enormous opportunity for economic development if
governments are able to harness this reservoir of human capital and talent, it may also
pose a challenge to political stability if lack of access to employment opportunities and
joblessness persists, creating an extremely difficult environment for securing a decent
standard of living.43 Melanie Standish and Gale Muller reiterate a similar sentiment
stating that the “desire for jobs underpinned the Arab Spring, forcing Middle Eastern
countries to rethink their job creation efforts and… providing greater opportunities for
youth employment.”44 A 2011 MDG report echoes a similar cautionary note. The report
indicates that 20% of North African youth were unable to find jobs in 2008.45 This poor
employment climate forced many youths to flood the informal sector and engage in low-

40

Nick Mead. (2012, May 28). Youth unemployment takes shine off Africa’s economic growth. The
Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/may/28/africaneconomic-outlook-2012-youth-unemployment
41
African Economic Outlook 2012. (2012). [Graph illustration The Guardian May 28, 2012]. Retrieved from
https://www.google.com/fusiontables/data?docid=1wjrxuCjjgYpI46-Gacv7aFOIqCNNYvpIgshsPZo
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Melanie Standish and Gale Muller. (2012, July 30). World Pessimistic About Job Prospects. Gallup.
Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/156341/world-pessimistic-job-prospects.aspx
45
United Nations Development Programme. (2011). Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium
Development Goals: MDG Report 2011. New York.
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productivity jobs which authors of the report suggest, may have contributed to the
brewing social and economic conditions that culminated in the wave of protests that
swept the North Africa and Middle East regions.46 Taking this into consideration, African
governments should be keen to reinvigorate job creation efforts in order to avoid
potential demonstrations and riots as those led by the Arab Spring.

A macroeconomic model devised by Gallup outlines the general development
pathway that according to researchers, countries must follow in order to attain prosperous
societies.47 According to the following framework, individual well-being is both an end
goal and force that fuels positive growth and success in communities and in countries, if
and when it is attained.

46

Ibid.
Gallup World Path: Macroeconomics. Retrieved from
http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/156935/gallup-world-path-macroeconomics.aspx
47
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Source: Gallup World Path: Macroeconomics48

Along this trajectory, access to basic needs such as food and shelter is one of the
primary stepping stones toward individual and consequently, societal well-being. Access
to “Good Jobs” both in quantity and quality occupies a mid-level residency on this
trajectory course whereby “the availability of good jobs correlates with higher wellbeing.”49 This Gallup study further bolsters the case for investing in economic
opportunities and job creation as a strategy for producing stable, prosperous, and thriving
societies.

For this thesis, Ghana will be examined in a comparative analysis against Nigeria
on the dimensions of security and stability, and economic growth and opportunity.
Moreover, I will look at the impact of these factors on the level, type, and outcome of
philanthropic activities in both counties. While they are disparate in many ways, there are
also points of similarity that allow for robust comparison. For example, Ghana and
Nigeria are both influential players in contributing to the maintenance of security in the
West African region due to the size of their economies (although the distribution of this
wealth is more skewed in the Nigerian case, which will be discussed in forthcoming
chapters). Additionally, both Ghana and Nigeria have achieved active electoral
democracy and citizen rule since the 1990s (although peaceful transitions have been more
of a norm in Ghana, while rigged and corrupt practices still exist in Nigeria). Along these
dimensions however, the contrasts that exist have impacted the direction of philanthropic

48
49

Ibid.
Ibid.
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investments in each country, leading to an unequal economic and employment growth
rate that is in favor of Ghanaian development but contributive to continued instability in
Nigerian economic and political security.

While Ghana has been referred to as a shining, model democracy in the West
African region, Nigeria instead has been regarded as a country steeped in corruption,
chaos, and violence. According to Erin Burnett, “In 2008, Nigeria was ranked 18th out of
the 60 most unstable countries on the Failed States Index of the Foreign Policy and Fund
for Peace, U.S., and 129th in the ranking of 140 most peaceful countries on the Global
Peace Index of the Vision for Humanity, Australia.”50 Taking into consideration the
Gallup World Path framework, the first milestone on the trajectory (law and order) is still
unmet in Nigeria and the country is not faring well on the subsequent two milestones that
serve as prerequisites to good jobs (i.e. food and shelter, and institutions and
infrastructure). Accordingly, the ultimate achievement of quality GPD growth in Nigeria
will be put at risk, which in return will feed discontent, unrest, and political instability as
I have argued in previous sections.

In a Congressional research report, Lauren Ploch, offers a harrowing estimate of
more than 14,000 Nigerians who have been killed since 1999 due to sectarian and ethnic
violence that often stems from a fierce competition for land rights, jobs, and other
avenues of socioeconomic development.51 Not only is violence rampant in the country,

50

Erin Burnett (Producer). (2007). Dollars and Danger: Africa, the Final Investing Frontier. New York:
CNBC.
51
Congressional Research Service. (2012). Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: Lauren
Ploch.
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the Nigerian police and security forces have been accused of human rights abuses, guilty
of unleashing brute force, violence, and even torture on some communities to stem
unrest.52 Furthermore, rampant corruption within the Nigerian government and Nigeria
Police Force has created an apathetic and tolerant culture toward violence in some areas
leading warlords such as militant Islamist leader, Boko Haram, in the northern region of
the country to become emboldened in their terrorist tactics.53

Expanding on Ploch’s research, A.E. Ojie describes a country where political
assassinations occur widely, religious massacres and reprisal killings occur with high
frequency, and a total disregard for and violence toward human life is the operative
norm.54 In particular, Ojie asserts that Nigerian police have a large role in fueling this
type of environment as they too take part in corrupt practices such as bribery, harassment,
intimidation, and torture.55 This has resulted in high tensions between civilians and
Nigerian security forces and sheds light on the serious problem that “… there is no
dependable foundation for the maintenance of law and order in Nigeria by the police.”56
As Ojie explains, the ramshackle state of law and order is particularly worrisome, for the
instability and security issues that ensues serves as a serious threat to Nigeria’s fragile
democracy.57

52

Ibid, p. 14.
Ibid, p. 9-10.
54
A.E. Ojie. (2006). Democracy, Ethnicity, and the Problem of Extrajudicial Killing in Nigeria. Journal of
Black Studies, 36(4), p. 522.
55
Ibid, p. 560.
56
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These factors are also hampering Nigeria’s advancement on Gallup’s World Path
schematic, slowing progress toward the development of good jobs and ultimately the
quality GDP and economic growth that will be needed in order to contribute to a more
stable and secure nation. Other commentators and scholars on the issue of insecurity and
instability in Nigeria identify similar root causes as those that Ploch touches upon in her
research. J.J. Dibua for example, pinpoints the problem to a skewed distribution of wealth
that benefits a minority population, and the marginalization and deliberate efforts on the
part of the Nigerian government to disenfranchise certain ethnic groups by barring their
access to lands and stripping their rights to use and control the natural resources that are
abundant in those territories, among other forms of economic repression.58 As a response
to increasingly violent tactics employed by the Nigerian Police Force to suppress civil
unrest in these communities, youth groups have organized and responded by becoming
increasingly militant in their reprisal strategies.59 In fact, in November of 1999 a
confrontation between a large, militant organization comprised of over 5,000 youths
culminated in what is known as the Odi massacre and led youths to resort to tactics such
as kidnapping employees of oil companies, murdering security personnel, destroying oil
installations, and stealing crude oil for sale on the black market.60 Such incidences
illustrate the significance of economic opportunities such that the lack of access to the use
and control of lands and natural resources can spur and fuel social unrest and political
instability.
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Further, Meg Handley offers what many Nigerians argue as the cause of violence
to be rooted in a “scramble for land, scarce resources and political clout”61 as opposed to
religious or ethnic differences. Moreover, “poverty, joblessness and corrupt politics drive
extremists from both sides to commit horrendous atrocities”62 whereby herder
communities from the north and farmers from the south fight over rights to fertile lands,
and an unequal distribution of oil wealth in the Delta region has prompted citizens to
resort to militant tactics in their demand for a greater share of revenue.63 The core
motivation behind these conflicts can be attributed to a desire for greater economic
agency, participation, and well-being. Elisabeth Rosenthal describes the situation as
deteriorating and reports alarming youth unemployment rates. In urban areas, among high
school and university graduates, aged 15-24 reaching nearly as high as 50% and
Rosenthal attributes this to be main driver of discontent and crime.64 The most recent
MDG report outlining progress and challenges in Africa specifically highlights the
marginalization of youths as a pressing issue of concern for the continent. Africa, in fact,
has the largest youth to total population ratio worldwide and their continued
disenfranchisement will be a source of discord with the potential to erupt into violence.65
Rosenthal further offers that according to experts, “the swelling ranks of unemployed
youths with little hope have fed the growth of the radical Islamist group Boko Haram,
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which has bombed or burned more than a dozen churches and schools this year.”66 Of
greater concern is a potential link between Haram’s forces with al-Qaeda networks which
security analysts warn is a threat to stability in the Sahel region.67

In fact, Oladiran Bello writes, Nigeria is of central importance in efforts to
improve security in the Sahel region overall which is currently pervaded by al-Qaeda
operatives in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.68 Bello warns that “regional stability is
impossible without Nigerian leadership” as deteriorating security within its borders can
mean increased “drug trafficking and other trans-border crimes linking West Africa and
the Sahel.”69 He suggests that security efforts led by the European Union should focus on
securing and stabilizing the northern region where Haram has been intensifying
recruitment efforts and looking to accelerate the process of radicalization.70 Burnett adds,
that violent and inhumane treatment by the government and state security forces have
exacerbated the insurgency which has the grave potential to spread instability across the
Gulf of Guinea and into neighboring Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, both of which
have been attacked by Nigerian gangs in recent times.71

In addition to investing in job creation and youth employment in particular as
mentioned above, another constituency that has historically been marginalized and
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excluded from the formal employment sector are women. In Africa as a whole, women
are disproportionately represented in the informal sector but make up less than 50% of all
wage position in the non-agricultural sector.72 As the following chart indicates, Ghana
surpasses Nigeria in the percentage of women employed in waged positions external to
the agricultural sector.

Source: United Nations Development Programme73

While this population is not as volatile, susceptible, and inclined to conduct
violent, retribution tactics, they are an important group to bear in mind in the design and
implementation of job creation efforts.
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Ghanaian democracy however, is thriving in comparison. The peaceful transition
that occurred during the last round of elections in 2009 which transferred power from
John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party to John Atta Mills of the National Democratic
Congress signaled an era of robust and more imbedded democratic practices in the
electoral process. Even further, when President Mills passed away in the summer of
2012, John Dramani Mahama was sworn in immediately just two hours after the
announcement of Mills’ death. This historical moment signaled a rare but emerging
commitment to the constitution and by expansion, the democratic system. Ghana is
making substantial progress as compared to Nigeria on the MDG goals including major
improvements in efforts to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, and to provide
universal primary education.74 As such, along Gallup’s World Path framework, Ghana is
on course and ahead of Nigeria in achieving quality GPD growth. Furthermore, as
mentioned in earlier sections, a stronger Ghanaian economy based on GDP data and
projections lends support to this statement. Finally, unemployment is also lower in Ghana
than in Nigeria, while the HDI measure higher, which has likely contributed to the
relative political stability that has been enjoyed by the country. In order to produce
similar levels of security and political stability as apparent in Ghana, Nigeria will need to
make heavy investments in democratizing economic participation, creating job
opportunities for its expanding population and especially a growing, educated youth
constituent, and promoting quality, distributive economic growth. And, these objectives
can be achieved via innovative, philanthropic investment strategies which will be
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discussed in forthcoming chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR

The Contributive Potential of Philanthropic Work toward Global Development and
Security Goals
Foreign aid has many advantages for both donors and recipients but may also
result in repercussions and negative consequences for recipients. There are a multitude of
motivations including being utilized as a diplomacy tool by donor countries to further
economic or security agendas, and/or to gain political leverage. Further yet, other
objectives of foreign aid are geared toward promoting donor-led development policy in
recipient countries.75

In surveying the landscape of IR theories of foreign aid, Tomohisa Hattori
discusses the various studies that aim to answer the question: what is foreign aid?
Political realists would define foreign aid as a policy tool that emerged during the Cold
War in order to drive political loyalties in a bi-polar world order.76 Liberal
internationalists take a more benevolent stance and describe the objective and function of
foreign aid as a means to promote socio-economic and political development abroad.77
Finally, Hattori uncovers the world system theory which establishes foreign aid as an
instrument that restrains the development trajectories of recipient countries and
contributes to the unequal distribution of capital and wealth throughout the world.78
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These answers however are lacking and incomplete according to Hattori. His main
critique is that these theories simply address the function of foreign aid rather than its
essence. Even further than exploring what foreign aid does is the examination of what
foreign aid is, and to that objective, Hattori, maintains that it functions as a symbol of
power hierarchies between the donor and recipient countries.79 Hattori expresses concern
and critique for current theories that miss this point in their preoccupation with the policy
objectives and effects of foreign aid.80 Instead, he prefers to conceptualize foreign aid as
“the pervasive hierarchy between the industrialized states and their former colonies,
[which has been] naturalized by a practice of extending and accepting gifts.”81 Hattori’s
analysis centers solely on bi-lateral foreign aid relations. However, he is keen to
emphasize that there are forms of aid that operate beyond the state level including
individual donations, philanthropic aid, multilateral grants via international organizations
and, what he terms as other types of “institutionalized giving practices.”82 These forms of
foreign aid he argues, serve to further skew hierarchical structures between donors and
recipients with the only difference being that the relational dynamic is “mediated by a
third party organization.”83

While Hattori’s critique is important to keep in mind, there is also an expansive
amount of good that can be derived from foreign aid programs, and specifically via
philanthropic means. Howard Husock argues for philanthropic driven aid citing high

79

Ibid, p. 633.
Ibid, p. 649.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
80

31

incidences of ineffectiveness in government run social services programs.84 Private
donations however, would be a more appealing option because philanthropic
organizations can often tailor programs and adapt efforts to local needs rather than
inappropriately force “one-size-fits-all” federally designed programs onto communities
that do not have the conditions necessary to achieve success.85 In addition, aid recipients
of privately financed donations are expected to track progress and show results.86 These
expectations lend to higher levels of both efficiency and effectiveness than programs
funded by governments, which often the capacity to track, measure, and report results.

Moyo adopts a similar view towards foreign aid disbursements taking place at the
state-to-state or government-to-government level. She identifies the abundant aid flow
into Africa as the source of continued poverty throughout the continent.87 For the past
fifty years, she describes, aid has been poured into Africa leading African leaders and
governments to believe that it is a consistent and permanent source of income that is
unlikely to be cut off.88 Consequently, African governments have had little incentive to
pursue sound, strong, and vigorous financial planning efforts or look for alternative
capital and funding opportunities.89 According to Moyo, foreign aid in this form
perpetuates poverty in a multistep manner. Firstly, free-flowing aid serves to prop corrupt
governments by making available an unlimited and generous source of wealth and
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income to leaders who disregard civilian liberties, reject the rule of law, and conduct
activities – issuing economic, political, and social policy decisions – in a highly nontransparent fashion.90 Moreover, opaque and corrupt environments tend to reduce and
stifle private investments due to the increased risks that follow and reduced guarantees
for return.91 As a result, fewer investments hamper economic growth which leads to
fewer job opportunities and thereby, protracted poverty.92 Greater poverty levels prompt
donor countries to disburse even more aid which subsequently reinforces a culture of
dependency on foreign financial assistance which perpetuates rampant and deep
poverty.93

Instead, as suggested earlier, instilling expectations for a strong return, including
tracking, measurement, and reporting procedures would be important for donors to insist
upon as a standard practice for aid recipients to produce. Moyo compares China’s
endeavors in Africa as significantly more successful than that of the West. She writes
“The secret of China’s success is that its foray into Africa is all business. The West sent
aid to Africa and ultimately did not care about the outcome; this created a coterie of elites
and, because the vast majority of people were excluded from wealth, political instability
has ensued.”94 China, Moyo describes, expects and even demands a return for their
investments, which leads to positive results such as job creation, infrastructure and road
development, and food poverty alleviation.95 As these series of events and benefits
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unravel, the average African becomes better off which helps to maintain political
stability.96 Moyo maintains that it is absolutely a growing economy that precludes
political stability and cites Singapore as one example of this claim. Singapore she
describes is a nation of relative peace and order even in the absence of democracy
because the median citizen enjoys more favorable economic conditions.97 Finally, she
concludes that what Africa needs from the West is not more unrestricted aid but
investment in the form of public-private partnerships and corporate leadership in foreign
direct investments (FDI).98 Additionally, she calls for other “private-capital solutions to
development financing,”99 which I will add, include an array of impact investing funding
options.

Other scholars also see value in increased corporate investment as one method to
lift African nations out of poverty. Sandra T. Barnes describes a dilemma that many
foreign corporation face when considering making investments in Africa. While they
recognize that the region is an immense opportunity for profit gains, there are also
challenges of infrastructural weakness, poor tax and other economic policies, and often
corrupt, bureaucratic practices and political red tape that exist.100 Consequently, private
sector actors have embraced strategic philanthropy in order to directly contribute to the
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development of communities in which they operate and improve African livelihoods.101
Barnes explains the evolution and rise of corporate engagement in this region as follows:

The message that conflict and poverty are bad for business is giving rise to
a fresh set of business practices that are making their way throughout the
world by means of a new kind of corporate philanthropy. In the past three
to five years, corporations have been attempting to increase their value and
shield themselves from a multitude of negative forces – including the
ramifications of working in weak states – by engaging in local community
development projects. These projects are known as ‘strategic
philanthropy’.102

To further illustrate the extent and potential of corporate-driven aid to contribute
to development efforts in Africa, Barnes offers that multinational companies allocate
between 0.5-4% of their in-country operating budgets every year to community
development projects.103 She cites examples ranging from Alcoa’s $5 million investment
in Guinean communities, which is just over 4% of its budget for annual operating
costs.104 Moreover, General Electric has been an active player in South Africa,
contributing $20 million to help build and strengthen health infrastructure in the
country.105 Finally, of the five Shell companies based in Nigeria, one has spent $60
million, making up 3% of its annual operating budget on community development
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projects.106 While these figures look substantial and in many cases does in fact provide
the much needed financial resources to have a positive impact on impoverished
communities, Barnes adds that it should be noted that these contributions are not all for
naught and companies expect a rate of return on investments in the range of 26-28%.107

Foreign corporations have a vested interest in seeing to the development and wellbeing of the communities in which they operate. Daimler-Chrysler for example has
recognized this after finding a way to use sisal (a plant fiber) in car interior parts. In order
to ensure that their supply needs were met, the company helped local farmers return to
and improve sisal production methods.108 Barnes explains that as the world marketplace
becomes more competitive, companies are beginning to look for new opportunities at the
base of the pyramid (BoP) where there is massive potential for tapping into an expansive
consumer base. A report published by the Monitor Group references C.K. Prahalad’s
contribution to directing attention and spurring interest in this sector. In his book titled,
“The Fortune of the Bottom of the Pyramid,” Prahalad argues that the purchasing
potential of this group is enormous and should be taken seriously by the corporate
sector.109 Prahalad points out that there are billions of people living in poverty worldwide
and together, they have a combined purchasing power of $5 trillion. In order for
companies to achieve success in this space, they must contribute to building and fostering
conditions in these communities that enable them to operate securely, sustainably, and
with a potential for growth. Barnes references an argument by world renowned Harvard
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economist, Michael Porter, who states that “in today’s business environment, an
enterprise cannot expect to compete and survive unless it is integrated into and
contributing to the full social context in which it operates.”110

A study by the Monitor Company Group finds that corporate initiatives aimed at
the BoP are disproportionately implemented in South Africa as the following chart
illustrates:

Source: Monitor Company Group111

110

Sandra T. Barnes. (2005). Global Flows: Terror, Oil & Strategic Philanthropy. Review of African Political
Economy, 5(104), p. 244.
111
Monitor Company Group. (2011). Promise and Progress: Market-Based Solutions to Poverty in Africa.
Cambridge: Michael Kubzansky, Ansulie Cooper, & Victoria Barbary.

37

The private sector is tellingly much stronger in South Africa than any other nation
in SSA. There are a total of 32 national and multinational corporations operating in South
Africa whose businesses target the BoP but only 6 companies in Ghana who do the
same.112 Even more appalling is the fact that there is just 1 company operating in Nigeria
that engages the BoP.113 Although undesirable this finding underscored the need and
potential in Nigeria for corporate engagement with the BoP.

At the same time, while Barnes welcomes multinational contributions toward
development efforts and goals, she also recognizes potential downfalls to this model.
Firstly, similar to Hattori’s assessment, she does acknowledge that corporate giving
dynamics can perpetuate power structures that cultivate and perpetuate a dependency
culture.114 She also points out that there are many cases where payments to elite leaders
and government officials in the form of taxes and profit cuts fail to reach the masses and
intended recipients.115 Instead, these funds are squandered, further bolstering the
economic status of the already well to do. This is a grave problem as resentment grows
for those that benefit and has a tendency to erupt in the form of anger and violence.116
Specifically, Barnes cites the tumultuous situation that is currently being witnessed in the
Niger Delta in which fighting amongst communities stems from perceived inequalities.117
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Alberto Chong et al. echo a similar concern and in their research examine the
effect of foreign aid on reducing poverty and income inequalities, they find that aid on its
own does not have a significant effect on either measure.118 They also cite studies
conducted by William Easterly and Rajan and Subramanian which also conclude that
foreign aid has no effect on growth even when the quality of institutions (strong
transparency and accountability, low corruption) is high.119 In fact, as Brautigam and
Knack posit, aid may actually lead democratic institutions to deteriorate in quality.120
According to Figure 1 below which illustrates the relationship between inequality (as
measured by the Gini coefficient), foreign aid, and institutional quality, Chong et. al.
report the following findings: When institutional quality is high (i.e. corruption is low),
an increase in foreign aid flows from low to medium levels actually increases income
disparity (i.e. income distribution becomes more unequal, or the Gini coefficient falls).121
However, when aid increases from medium to high, the distribution of income is
relatively unchanging.122 When considering recipient countries where the quality of
institutions is weak, the study finds that income inequality does not change when aid
increases from low to medium.123 Interestingly, however there is a sharp increase in the
Gini coefficient when foreign aid pours into the system from medium to high levels.124
This illustrates that inequality and disparity rises when corruption is high and yet aid
continues to flow and is consistent with Barnes’ earlier aforementioned cautionary note.
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Source: Alberto Chong, Mark Gradstein, &Cecilia Calderon. (2009). Can foreign aid
reduce income inequality and poverty? Public Choice, (140), p. 61.125

Furthermore, Huntington also cautions that economic development as yielded by
foreign aid assistance may not necessarily produce more equality and more stability.126
He contends, “It could well exacerbate regional differences, promote differential rates of
social mobilization and economic well-being among ethnic group, and enhance
communal consciousness through increasing literacy and education.”127 Instead, gradual
(as opposed to rapid) improvements in economic conditions would help to counter the
unbalanced and biased economic growth and increase in income inequality that may
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result from foreign aid receipts. That is, rapid growth may contribute to politically
destabilizing conditions and so he advocates for gradual growth to mediate against these
potential outcomes.128

Despite these seemingly grave challenges and repercussions of foreign aid on the
economic and political environments of recipient countries, it is important to note that
there is a difference between traditional foreign aid in the form of state to state grantmaking and loan arrangements (which is the type of aid addressed in Alberto and
Huntington’s analysis above) as opposed to the investment aid and capital via corporate
players and strategic philanthropic means that is the focus of Barnes’ study.
Alternatively, there are a plethora of benefits that a philanthropic model of foreign aid
can generate. In an interview conducted by the Georgetown Journal of International
Affairs, Thomas Pogge and Carol Lancaster promote this route arguing that philanthropic
organizations and endeavors are not as inflexibly bound by government interests and
priorities as traditional foreign aid program via government, or bilateral bodies.129
According to Pogge, U.S. funded aid programs are often “… adulterated by other ulterior
motives… [and] used as a policy instrument toward advancing the geostrategic interests
of the United States.”130 They offer however, that privately funded, corporate investments
can improve the communities within which they operate and also increase profit potential
at the same time.131 This strategy constitutes a type of market-based approach that
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endorses and reinforces the triple bottom line approach of “doing good while doing
business.”

The adage illustrates a shift toward a growing culture of corporate social
responsibility (CSR). In a panel discussion organized by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Jane Wales explains that CSR has prompted business leaders and corporations
to consider the impact of their operations on social change as well as points along the
design, production, and consumption chain where they may contribute a value add.132
Further, Carol Adelman sees an enormous potential in building the CSR sector. In fact,
she cites that private donations to the developing world surpassed those made by the
government for the first time in the 1990s.133 Whereas 80% of aid contributions from the
developed world were government funded in the 1950s with only 20% being private
donations, the most recent figures show a shift toward privately funded foreign aid.134
Today, only 13% of all aid flows originating from developed countries are government
funded while a staggering 80% are privately sourced.135 These financial resources include
investment capital, remittance payments, as well as traditional, philanthropic grants.136 A
percentage of these privately funded donations are also comprised of corporate giving
and private sector philanthropic programs.
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In a study examining the ethics of foreign direct investments and exploring how
companies can contribute to social good while turning a profit at the same time, Roland
Bardy, Stephen Drew, and Tumenta F. Kennedy have identified a tremendous
opportunity for companies to make foreign investments in Africa, noting several reasons
including a report by UNCTAD that FDI in Africa yields the highest rate of return in the
world as evidenced by the following chart:

Source: McKinsey Global Institute137
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They write, “While not yet as competitive as the BRIC countries, the
demographics bode well for Africa as a market as more than half its population is under
the age of 24. Europe’s population will lose 60 million people by 2050, however, Africa
will add 900 million.”138 The population bulge in Africa, while worrisome and may
become a development challenge, can also be regarded as an enormous business
potential. Opportunities for tapping into the millions that make up the market at the BoP
are ample and can be sought in the expansion of education sector, of healthcare and
banking services, as well as the proliferation in need for infrastructure in addition to
serving as a general population for consumer goods.139

Charles Roxburgh et al. further emphasize the opportunity to conduct business
with this growing population reporting an estimate of about 85 million African
households earning $5,000 or more.140 This is the income level at which half of all
earning are spent on items other than food.141 In the next ten years, this number is
expected to grow by 50% bringing the number of households with discretionary income
to 128 million.142 By 2030, it is projected that the combined spending power of the top
eighteen cities in Africa could reach $1.3 trillion.143 These figures should provide
corporations, foundations, and other investors with the incentive to conduct business and
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pursue strategic, philanthropic activities in the region. And, the potential rate of return in
targeting this consumer base is phenomenal.

In addition to the lure and attractiveness of a growing consumer base with
discretionary income, there are several other reasons for investing in African economies.
Firstly, what is most troubling as described in a report by the Rockefeller Foundation is
the decline in resources and budget cuts resulting in smaller foreign aid packages from
the West.144 The report notes that “Philanthropic giving was uneven and declining in
some areas for both domestic and international projects.”145 This reality signals a need to
shift from development dependency on traditional foreign aid assistance to strategic,
philanthropic methods that prioritize investment and impact for results. Furthermore, as
the map below indicates, the value of reported investments in 2011 was skewed and there
is large gap between amounts invested in Africa as compared to other regions of the
world.
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Source: Rockefeller Foundation146

This illustrates a large potential and also need for further investment in Africa as a
whole. A second reason, why the development landscape will begin relying on
philanthropic giving and investments as opposed to receiving funding from a depleting
reservoir of government backed foreign aid assistance packages, is their deteriorating
legitimacy with the public. A report by the Council on Foundations offers the following
insight:

As governments lose capacity, they are losing public trust. The result is an
increasingly hostile and polarized political environment. We are seeing
growing social discontent and protests such as the Occupy and Tea Party
movements in the United States and riots linked to severe austerity
146
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measures in Europe. More and more, the public is looking to the business
world for leadership, not just in the economic realm but in the social
realm.147

On a promising note, we are seeing evidence of increasing corporate engagement
in this arena as they begin to recognize the large potential for growth in African
economies. Private capital flows to Africa have risen substantially beginning in 2003 as
the following chart illustrates:

Source: McKinsey Global Institute148
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In fact, FDI grew from just $9 billion in 2000 to $62 billion in 2008.149 This
growth demonstrates an emerging trend and interest towards investment in the region.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Opportunities for Strategic Philanthropy: Investment Climate, Methods, and Obstacles to
Growth
Not only is the consumer population growing and strengthening as discussed in
previous chapters, the labor force in Africa is also expanding at an unprecedented rate.
By the year 2040, it is projected that there will be 1.1 billion Africans of working age.150
And as illustrated below, this would mean that Africa’s workforce is expected to surpass
that of both India and China’s.
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Source: McKinsey Global Institute151

Roxburgh et al. suggests taking steps to harness this human capital by providing
the education and skills they need to succeed.152 This in turn can significantly boost
worldwide consumption and production levels.153 Also important to note is the
deleterious consequences that may ensue if governments and societies fail to engage this
large workforce. Continued population growth without expanded access to jobs both in
quality and quantity can cause friction in society. Therefore, I echo Roxburgh et al. and
argue that it is of increasing urgency to engage this growing constituency so that they are
appropriately absorbed into the formal, economic sector.

In addition to the capital potential that Africa’s growing population provides by
way of serving as both a large consumer base and productive labor force, three other
major industries that form a combined potential business worth of $2.6 trillion by the
year 2020 are resource extraction, agriculture, and infrastructure as illustrated in the chart
below:
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Source: McKinsey Global Institute154

The resource extraction industry in Africa includes petroleum drilling as well as
mineral mining activities. In Nigeria and more recently Ghana, oil production has
generated a substantial revenue stream for both nations. However, the extent to which oil
wealth has reached the masses in Nigeria is problematic and has been a source of
sustained corruption and disparity between the classes.

Agricultural development however has a large potential of impacting the masses
and improving their livelihoods and wellbeing. The African continent alone amasses 60%
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of the world’s share of total uncultivated, arable land.155 For companies, agricultural
pursuits and development of the sector holds enormous business potential. In addition,
because Africa experiences low crop yields, there is a ripe opportunity for igniting a
“green revolution” which not only would transform the sector as was witnessed in Asia
and Brazil but also improve the livelihoods of farmers and create jobs both in upstream
and downstream markets.156 New business opportunities would arise exponentially at a
rate that Roxburgh et al. estimate would lead to a $35 billion market for upstream inputs
(of which fertilizer products would constitute the largest share) by 2030, from current
values at around $8 billion.157 This figure translates to a $14 billion potential revenue for
suppliers and in $3 billion in profits.158 Similar projects for downstream markets are
estimated to grow from a value of approximately $40 billion to $240 billion in 2030, with
the largest opportunity in business for vegetable and fruit processing services.159

Roxburgh et al. do however recognize challenges in Africa’s agriculture sector
which stifles production levels including lack of access to and use of advanced seeds
which are able to overcome the harsh ecology found on the continent, poor road
infrastructure which hampers the transportation of crops to markets, unfavorable trade
barriers, weak and unclear laws regarding the use and ownership to land rights, and lack
of access to financing for farmers.160 Fortunately, if these barriers to growth can be
overcome, there would be potential for sector output to increase from $280 billion to
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$880 billion by 2030.161 Furthermore, this would mean that demand for upstream
products such as seeds and fertilizers would grow, leading to an increase in downstream,
processing activities such as grain refining.162 The yield and output potential exhibited in
this sector is a lucrative market for which CSR and strategic philanthropic investments
should be made. Additionally, there are vast opportunities for job growth toward which
companies could contribute. And finally, expanded access to employment would not only
create a larger consumer base with more disposable income to spend but also improve
livelihoods and in turn, political and social stability.

Of special interest to note, improvement of the agriculture sector via increased
investment aid could reduce already strained resources and competition for employment
in urban areas. Jobs added in this sector could attract youth and human capital from urban
cities and potentially reverse urban migration patterns, alleviating tensions that result
from competition over scarce jobs and contributing to stable social and political
environments.

Similar business opportunities and investment needs as discussed above for the
agricultural sector exist in the infrastructure space. African governments and private
companies have currently invested an estimated $72 billion in infrastructure projects.163
Further, we are seeing an interest and growth in investments from private sources which
account for 13% of the total directed into the emerging markets (an increase from 7% in
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2000).164 In spite of growth in activity levels, Africa still needs $46 billion more per year
in order to meet infrastructure gaps in power and water distribution, and transportation
infrastructure.165 And, according to Roxburgh et al., this funding gap could be met
through a combination of spending programs allocated by African governments, private
company investments, and policy and regulation reforms.166

As discussed, the investment landscape for strategic philanthropic activities is
ripe. Africa makes up the world’s third fastest-growing region as the chart below
indicates:
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Source: McKinsey Global Institute167

Acceleration in Africa’s economic growth rate after 2000 translates into new, and
more commercial opportunities for the private sector to seize. Consequently, corporations
are increasingly recognizing the business potential of impact investing, as well as value in
pursuing these strategies to enhance triple bottom line returns in financial, social, and
environmental arenas; strategic investment toward generating impact and results emerges
as a preferred approach to development aid. The Council on Foundations offers the
following explanation as a motivation for the investment approach, stating, “the reason
we use investment is to distinguish between charity and philanthropy.”168 This is an
important distinction that communicates an expectation toward result-oriented,
development aid versus traditional and often ineffective, grant-making approaches.
Additional emerging trends in corporate giving strategies are offered below:
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Source: Council on Foundations169

Apparent in this comparison is a shift in mindset toward the ultimate objective of
value creation.170 Moreover, the outlook would place emphasis on value that fulfills both
profit and social development objectives.

In collaboration with the Acumen Fund, a venture fund that invests in social
enterprises to alleviate global poverty, the Monitor Group conducted extensive research
and assessments that culminated in a report titled, “From Blueprint to Scale: The Case for
Philanthropy in Impact Investing.” The study advocates an alternate channel for
philanthropic investment that is different than the corporate-led strategies and
motivations discussed above. Instead, Harvey Koh, Ashish Karamchandani, and Robert
Katz promote a practice which they term “enterprise philanthropy.” According to them,
the availability of impact capital alone will not necessarily unlock the full potential of the
industry to affect social and environmental development while generating a financial
return at the same time.171 Even though venture funds may exist, the challenge lies in
finding “good opportunities to invest for impact.”172 The reason, explains Koh et al., is
the exorbitant risks that investors must absorb when engaging social ventures at the
embryonic stage. Katherine Milligan describes the expansion of social enterprise ventures
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as an emerging “fourth sector.”173 As illustrated below, social enterprises merge both forprofit and non-profit or government objectives:

Source: Credit Suisse174

These enterprises take market-based approaches toward alleviating poverty and
social ills for those living at the BoP.175 They are characterized by similar objectives
aimed toward tapping into potential consumers at the BoP while offering ‘push’ products
such as preventative healthcare which differs from ‘pull’ products such as mobile
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phones.176 ‘Push’ products are more difficult to sell than desireable and marketable ‘pull’
products and require high up-front expenditures to bring to scale.177 This creates a very
challenging environment for enterprises to operate and reduces investor confidence. In
surveying over 400 enterprises in Africa, the Monitor Group learned that only a small
percentage (13%) were operating at scale.178 Thirty-two percent of these enterprises
however had a potential for scale but a majority were still risky investments that were not
yet proven as strong business models with a potential for financial returns.179 As a result,
a circular and self-reinforcing problem ensues whereby impact investors seek strong,
viable investment opportunities but are presented with weak portfolios and pioneer
entrepreneurs are unable to secure the financing necessary at early stages of business
development in order to bring their models to par. A financial service gap thus exists for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) which perpetuates the challenging investment
climate that is all too familiar to investors in this region. Koh et al. however promote
enterprise philanthropy as a crucial sector that should be nurtured, contending that it will
play a significant role in providing the early-stage capital needed in order to grow
inclusive businesses to a stage in firm development that is attractive to impact investors.

There are also various other types of investment funding options that are available
to social entrepreneurs. These options are outlined below:
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Source: Credit Suisse180

As discussed earlier, aid in the form of traditional grant allocations do not require
recipients to repay the aid amount. One downside to this model however is the tendency
of encountering weaker results and lower rates of return as these expectations are not
typically tied to the aid; the objective towards impact thus suffers. Additionally, grant aid
is often bound by the issue areas of interest prioritized by the donor rather than those that
are most pressing to the recipient, and the aid is subject to parameters set by the donor in
regards to the scope of the issue addressed as well as methods for program
implementation. Other financing structures include debt and private equity options as
well as mezzanine and hybrid capital funds. The two main financing products that are
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available to SMEs in Africa are debt and private equity.181 Still however, the financing
amounts needed by entrepreneurs in this region are between $1,000 to $100,000 and
investors typically avoid these types of investments because the upfront expenditures and
transaction costs may be high.182 In these cases, there is a need for broader financing
products to fill the financing gap for SMEs and in particular, early stage ventures.183 The
types of products suggested by the Rockefeller Foundation include, “angel financing or
royalty-based [repayment mechanisms] with manageable levels of interest and supporting
business development services.”184 Non-profit philanthropic, investment funds can also
help to fill this gap. A report conducted by Credit Suisse on impact investment in social
enterprises reports an increase in the availability of these types of funds with some
sustaining over $1 billion in capital. The report explains:

These funds target SMEs because many believe them to be the best
way to achieve the greatest social impact on local economies. This is
mainly because SMEs then to be the backbone of most emerging
economies, driving entrepreneurship and opportunity, job creation and
training, and ultimately also economic growth and poverty reduction.185
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The fact that many businesses in West Africa are small, individual or family
owned operations poses another challenge. For those businesses that are eligible for
equity investments, there is a high resistance against giving up full ownership by
accepting private equity capital.186 Most business owners instead are limited by the small
range of debt options with which they are willing to accept.187 It would be important
therefore to expand financial education and to encourage business owners to consider
equity capital options.

Clearly there are profit and social incentives for expanding the strategic
philanthropic or “enterprise philanthropy” sector. Furthermore, growth in this area can be
achieved via CSR and impact investment funding activities as discussed above. There are
however numerous barriers that must be overcome in order to unlock the full potential of
impact investing to produce not only profits but also the social and environmental returns
that round out the triple bottom line objective. One of the major challenges that continue
to stifle investor engagement is the weakness of measurement and evaluation
mechanisms. Measurement, tracking, and reporting systems are not well developed and
often inconsistent in the methods used (e.g. monitoring systems to track financial
accounts188). The information however is critical data for investors, who are interested in
assessing return on investments (ROI) values, output levels, results, and impact.189
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Developing accurate measurement systems would help to strengthen portfolios by
establishing expectations for transparency and accountability, promoting outcome driven
practices, and also encouraging investees to address challenges by reevaluating business
or program designs and taking the appropriate actions to course correct implementation
issues.190 Consequently, these activities would lead to increased investor confidence
which would translate to greater readiness and interest to invest.
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CHAPTER SIX

Philanthropic Activities, Progress, and Results in Ghana and Nigeria: Successes,
Challenges, and Lessons Learned
There are a plethora of reasons and incentives to pursue philanthropy driven
impact investments and grow activities in this sector. Economies can grow stronger
leading to job creation and broader improvements in living standards; and restiveness,
discontent, and violence igniting from social frustrations will also diminish. The
following section will highlight some of the innovative programs and enterprises being
implemented in Ghana and Nigeria to underscore the role that strategic philanthropy can
play in reducing poverty through job creation and ultimately stabilizing political and
social frictions.

The Rockefeller Foundation reports that most of the impact investments taking
place in West Africa are occurring in Ghana which my research confirms.191 There are
disproportionately more examples of impact investments and strategic philanthropic work
being conducted in Ghana than in Nigeria. As the following table shows, there are 23
private equity or venture capital funds targeting initiatives in Ghana while only 14 funds
exist for programs in Nigeria.192

191

Dalberg Global Development Advisors. (2012). Accelerating Impact: Achievements, Challenges and
What’s Next in Building the Impact Investing Industry. New York: Madjiguene Sock, Angela Hansen,
Liesbet Peeters, Susanne Normark Christensen, Afua Sarkodie-Kupka, Daniela Nwaobasi, &
Abdourahmane Diop.
192
Ibid.

63

Source: Dalberg Global Development Advisors193

Although Nigeria lags behind Ghana in terms of being able to attract impact
investors, there are some laudable examples of innovative and successful initiatives. The
following examples will serve to further highlight these programs.

Case Studies: Ghana
Savanna Farmer’s Marketing Company is a firm that is owned by a network of
over 40 NGOs that are mostly church-sponsored and focus on development work in
northern Ghana.194 This network comes together under the organization name of the
Association of Church Development Projects (ACDEP).195 Savanna acts as a broker for
smallholder farmers (SHF) to assist with getting their crops to market at fair prices. An
estimated 12,000 SHFs benefit from services provided by Savanna.196 Clients include a
local brewery owned by Guiness as well as Ghana Nuts, which exports various nuts to
European and Asian markets at a level of 20,000 tons annually.197 SHFs that work with
Savannah typically see an increase by about one-third in their incomes than if they were
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to sell crops through local farm brokers.198 And, additional savings are made possible
because Savannah absorbs and thus eliminates transportation costs to SHFs.199 Savannah
also helps SHFs to obtain financing at favorable rates by engaging and collaborating with
rural banks to arrange credit for SHFs.200 Preferential rates provided through these
arrangements are much lower than those that would be offered by larger commercial
banks (i.e. 28% versus 32-35%, respectively).201 Finally, Savannah will purchase crops
from SHFs at guaranteed prices so that SHFs can plan their household finances with more
consistency and confidence.202 The Savannah Company exemplifies a business model
that aims to address the triple bottom line. It is able to generate profit by operating an
export business that supplies local MNCs as well as foreign markets abroad. At the same
time, SHFs receive substantial economic benefits; they are able to continue working in
agriculture, observe an increase in incomes, and sustain their livelihoods. These outcomes
all contribute to larger development goals of lifting people out of poverty.

Voltic is a water company operating out of Ghana that expanded its business to
reach the BoP consumer market while also contributing to poverty alleviation through job
creation. Prior to this expansion, the company sold 500 ml bottled water to higher-end
consumers at $0.70 per bottle.203 Its market base was comprised of tourists, hotels, and
upper-income Ghanaians.204 However, an opportunity to service the BoP consumer was
soon recognized and Voltic developed a 500 ml sachet product priced at $0.035 per
198
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pouch.205 The new product was named Cool Pac. While there were already vendors and
other street hawkers selling sachets on the informal market, Voltic believed that BoP
consumers would recognize and attribute their brand to a quality product, thus
eliminating the market challenge of selling a product at a higher price point.206 In the
early stages of product development, Cool Pac was produced centrally in the capital of
Accra.207 However, logistical and distribution challenges to reach rural markets beyond
the city limits were costly and uncovered the need to decentralize production facilities.208
The company took steps to rethink its business model which resulted in identifying local
franchisees who were entrepreneurs with the capital and operational ability to run
factories and distribution chains (e.g. to wholesalers and street hawkers) in outlying
areas.209 Voltic split operational costs in half with these franchisees and observed a
substantial growth in sales and profit.210 The company sells an estimated 500,000 sachets
per day while creating 16 franchises, 560 jobs, and although informal, a source of income
generation for an estimated 10,000 hawkers.211 Voltic serves as an example of a
corporate-led, market-based solution toward poverty alleviation and underscores the
significant impact that corporation can have on communities by weaving CSR into
business models and practices.

The Ghanaian government also recognizes the strength and potential in pursuing
an impact investment model towards development. It established the Venture Capital
205
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Trust Fund (VCTF) in order to provide financial capital and resources to SMEs via
venture capital finance companies.212 VCTF’s goal is “to create a vibrant and wellstructured venture capital industry boasting of investments in various sectors, leading to
poverty reduction through job and wealth creation with a collateral growth in government
revenues.”213 Starting with just $15 million in seed funding, VCTF has grown its capital
pool to approximately $55 million.214 It has established five venture capital finance
companies through which $17 million have been invested in SMEs resulting in the direct
creation of 1,000 jobs as of the beginning of 2011.215 Some additional targets include
increasing its fund pool beyond $100 million, providing education to business owners on
the benefits of private equity investment options, and creating an Angel Investor Fund to
attract high net-worth individuals that could expand financing options for SMEs.216 These
activities have the potential to lift thousands of people out of poverty by creating jobs and
employment in the SME sector. Moreover, as noted earlier, SMEs in emerging countries
play a significant role in driving economic growth, which in conjunction with job
creation will further alleviate the poverty that fuels discontent, violence, and social and
political instability.

Case Studies: Nigeria
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The strength of the investment climate in Ghana is thriving as compared to that of
Nigeria’s. A survey of strategic, market-based, and impact oriented philanthropic
investments indicates a skewed level of activity in Ghana. Although investments are
markedly more abundant in Ghana, there are some examples of similar philanthropic
strategies being implemented in Nigeria. One such example is MN Environmental
Services Limited, a hygiene services and management company established in 2000 and
operating out of Lagos, Nigeria. The company was created by Adeola Asaba and Jife
Williams as an extension of their NGO, Metamorphosis Nigeria, which promotes safe
practices in hygiene and sanitation. MN Environmental Services Limited constructs and
maintains public showers and toilets in urban areas such as markets, transportation hubs,
and slum settlements in order to improve access to sanitary facilities. Users are charged
$0.24 to use the toilet and $0.32 to access showers. Moreover, these fees enable MN
Environmental Services Limited to hire hygiene assistants from the poor and
disadvantaged communities in which it operates and train staff not only to maintain these
facilities but to also teach users about health related issues.217 This self-sustainable, social
enterprise model has proven successful and the owners expect a rate of return of 24% on
the company’s equity investment in the enterprise.218 Long-term goals include plans to
construct 38 additional facilities in ten years which would directly create jobs for 260
people and indirectly employ 1,300 people.219

Another example of philanthropic, impact investing activities in Nigeria is The
Tony Elumelu Foundation which was established by Nigerian national, Tony Elumelu in
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2010. Its vision is “to contribute to Africa’s economic transformation and prosperity by
equipping the African private sector to lead the transformation. [Additionally, it]
recognises the power of impact investing and seeks to foster the acceptance, growth, and
deployment of significant impact capital towards addressing social problems in
Africa.”220 Particularly unique to this model is the Foundation’s focus on different stages
of the business development cycle. Investments will be made not only toward businesses
that are proven, viable, and scalable, but also to business students, start-up companies,
SMEs, national companies, and both African owned multinational and global
companies.221 The availability of investments to early-phase start-ups helps to alleviate
the financial services gap that is often experienced by venture entrepreneurs. Finally, the
Foundation is self-sustaining and with growing source of funds because all returns on
impact investments are re-invested into the organization’s capital financing programs and
grant-making activities.222
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CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion
The multitude of uprisings, protests, and demonstrations that we witness in
today’s world can be attributed to systemic failures in political, economic, and social
infrastructure. While recognizing that political instability stems from a variety of factors,
the scope of this thesis aimed to explore the economic conditions that contribute to
exacerbating national instability. Moreover, I argue economic growth and job creation
will alleviate poverty to levels that stifle political discontent and restore social stability
and security. The international community should especially recognize its vested interest
in assisting economic growth in other nations as the discontent and tensions that arise
among the economically disadvantaged and marginalized has great potential to erupt into
violence that will spill-over into neighboring countries and yield negative consequences
for regional stability.

My thesis supports this order of events by demonstrating greater levels of political
stability and social security in Ghana than in Nigeria; I attribute stability in Ghana to
advanced economic progress. Further, I demonstrate that Ghana’s economic and
employment environment far exceeds that of Nigeria’s because there are greater, more
impact and market-oriented, philanthropic activities taking place in the country. This
argument is confirmed by illustrating higher levels of corporate initiatives, FDI, venture
capital financing and other forms of impact and investment-oriented, philanthropic
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activities in Ghana. Accordingly, it would be prudent for the international community to
devise foreign aid assistance programs and initiatives that embody these methods.

Finally, these practices should be accelerated in Nigeria as to stifle the
progression of increasing ethnic and class tensions that culminate in violent clashes
which have the potential to spill-over into neighboring countries and affect stability in
broader, regional contexts. In order to attract and grow the impact investment sector, it
would be necessary for Nigeria to improve its economic and investment climate in the
following ways: 1) Revise licensing rules and regulations as well as tax policy to
encourage the informal sector to formalize. It is challenging for investors to conduct
business with the informal business and therefore continued neglect to construct a formal,
SME sector will perpetuate limited investment activities; 2) Develop financial resources
and programs, and educational campaigns to reduce business owners’ resistance toward
equity capital funding options thus enabling enterprise growth and expansion; 3) Attract
angel financing to fill the financial gap for start-up companies with smaller capital needs
than those typically offered and viewed warily as riskier investments; and 4) Support
efforts to create standardized measuring, tracking, and reporting systems in order to
entrench transparency and accountability expectations as to instill investor confidence
and encourage greater investments. Such steps would improve the impact investment
landscape in Nigeria, while the market-based solutions pursued would increase economic
development, create jobs, and reduce poverty levels. Only through the improved
livelihoods and standards of living that is achieved in this way, can political stability and
by extension, regional stability be sustained.
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